Excess Capacity: A Case Study in Ratemaking Theory and Application by Colton, Roger D.
Tulsa Law Review 
Volume 20 Issue 3 
Spring 1985 
Excess Capacity: A Case Study in Ratemaking Theory and 
Application 
Roger D. Colton 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Roger D. Colton, Excess Capacity: A Case Study in Ratemaking Theory and Application, 20 Tulsa L. J. 402 
(2013). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol20/iss3/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Tulsa Law Review by an authorized editor of TU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please 
contact megan-donald@utulsa.edu. 
EXCESS CAPACITY: A CASE STUDY IN
RATEMAKING THEORY AND APPLICATION
Roger D. Colton*
Recent declines in electric demand growth rates have left many
electric utilities with excess generating capacity. In many cases, state
utility regulators have responded by disallowing the inclusion of the costs
of the excess in rates charged to consumers. Mister Colton examines a
1984 Iowa Supreme Court decision and several recent administrative
decisions which discuss the ratemaking treatment of excess capacity. He
concludes that application of the historical used and useful test which
excludes excess capacity from rate base is appropriate.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, state public utility commissions have been forced to
grapple with the issue of how to treat excess electric generating capacity
for ratemaking purposes.' Public utilities nationwide have substantially
overbuilt capacity.2 Whether the surplus construction is attributable to
the industry's failure to foresee the recent.series of economic recessions, 3
or attributable to poor management planning,4 the overinvestment has
* General Counsel for the Community Action Research Group, Inc. (CARG), Ames, Iowa;
B.A., 1975, Iowa State University; J.D., 1981, University of Florida.
1. See, e-g., Washington Water Power Co., 58 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 126 (Idaho P.U.C. 1984);
Public Serv. Co., 51 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 6 (Ind. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1983); Public Serv. Co,, 57 Pub.
Util. Rep. 4th 563 (N.H. P.U.C. 1984); Pennsylvania Power Co., 60 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 593 (Pa.
P.U.C. 1984); South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co., 59 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 244 (S.C. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1984); Pacific Power & Light Co., 60 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 188 (Wash. Util. & Transp. Comm'n 1984).
For a review of earlier excess capacity administrative decisions, see Colton, Excess Capacity: Who
Gets the Charge from the Power Plant?, 34 HAsTINGs L.J. 1133 (1983).
2. See Pierce, The Regulatory Treatment of Mistakes in Retrospect: Canceled Plants and Ex.
cess Capacity, 132 U. PA. L. Rv. 497, 500-07 (1984); see also McCaughey, EElRedefines Reserves
and Slashes Margins to 25 Percent, The Energy Daily, Feb. 13, 1984, at 3 (discussing change method
of measuring reserve margins to avoid public misconception concerning reserves).
3. See Minnesota Power & Light Co., No. E-015/GR-81-250, slip op. at 8 (Minn. P.U.C. Apr.
30, 1982).
4. Cf Philadelphia Elec. Co., 31 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 15, 26 (Pa. P.U.C. 1978) ("In the past,
with customers paying for company errors in forecasts with resulting excess capacity, there has been
no incentive for company planners to adopt a more responsible and reliable posture in their forecasts
of load requirements.").
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resulted in generating capacity which is not reasonably necessary to pro-
vide adequate and reliable service.5
In 1981, the Missouri Public Service Commission stunned the utility
industry when it denied a return on investment in a power plant deter-
mined to be excess capacity.6 In the ensuing years, public utility com-
missions in a myriad of states took the same action,7 and a substantial
public debate arose regarding the proper ratemaking treatment of surplus
investment.' Today the regulatory process has reached the point where
state appellate court decisions are now being rendered in the judicial
challenges to those early excess capacity administrative decisions.9 The
court opinions consider the lawfulness of excess capacity adjustments in
light of constitutional and regulatory principles.
The Iowa Supreme Court's recent decision in Iowa-Illinois Gas &
Electric Co. v. Iowa State Commerce Commission'° is an example of this
recent line of state court cases. In Iowa-Illinois, the court was directly
faced with a range of crucial issues involved in excess capacity litigation.
The court addressed how to apply the traditional used and useful
ratemaking test to surplus investment. It directly confronted a situation
in which a utility's decision to construct additional capacity was prudent
when made, and the utility had been encouraged to undertake capacity
expansion by the very agency which later made the excess capacity
adjustment. I
The Iowa-Illinois court discussed the regulatory theories which un-
derlie the ratemaking response to these issues. This Article examines the
ratemaking theories explored by the court, 2 and considers the court's
5. See infra notes 96-110 and accompanying text. Excess capacity is capacity beyond that
which is reasonably necessary to provide efficient and reliable utility service. IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 476.53 (West Supp. 1984); see Public Serv. Co., 51 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 6, 10 (Ind. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1983).
6. See Kansas City Power & Light Co., 38 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 1, 13-15 (Mo. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1980); see also Excess Capacity Considered in Recent Cases, PUB. UTIL. FORT., May 7,
1981, at 53, 53 (discussion of Kansas City Power and other excess capacity cases).
7. For a comprehensive list of cases, see Colton, supra note 1, at 1133 nn.1-2.
8. See, eg., Schwartz & Colton, Excess Capacity, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 721 (1984); Spratley, Dol-
lars for Dinosaurs? or A Consumer Viewpoint on Equity and Efficiency Issues in the Treatment of
Excess Capacity, Cost Overruns and Project Terminations (August, 1984) (unpublished manuscript
presented to National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners).
9. Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co. v. Iowa State Commerce Comm'n, 347 N.W.2d 423 (Iowa
1984); City of Cleveland v. Public Util. Comm'n, 63 Ohio St. 2d 62, 406 N.E.2d 1370 (1980); Phila-
delphia Elec. Co. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 61 Pa. Commw. Ct. 325, 433 A.2d 620 (1981);
Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 109 Wis. 2d 127, 325 N.W.2d 339 (1982).
10. 347 N.W.2d 423 (Iowa 1984).
11. Id. at 428.
12. The Iowa Supreme Court limited its holding by stating: "We decide only the constitutional
issue. In deciding it we do not pass upon the method employed by the commission to determine
1985]
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definition of excess capacity, its definition of the used and useful princi-
ple, and its application of these concepts in a determination of the appro-
priate ratemaking treatment.
The Iowa-Illinois decision provides an excellent case study of the
definition and application of excess capacity principles. Where appropri-
ate, this Article will assess how the decision contrasts with decisions
around the nation which address particular excess capacity issues. 13 As
courts and administrative agencies continue to face these issues in the
future,14 a review and analysis of the state of the law should be beneficial
to regulators and industry practitioners alike. Before looking at the judi-
cial decision in Iowa-Illinois, however, it is first necessary to review the
state administrative decision to gain an understanding of the context
within which the judicial consideration of the regulatory issues occurred.
II. THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING
A. The Factual Background
In May 1981, Iowa-Illinois Gas and Electric Company (Iowa-
Illinois) filed a request with the Iowa State Commerce Commission for
permission to increase its retail electric rates by approximately fourteen
million dollars." The president of Iowa-Ilinois testified to the commis-
sion that the primary factor necessitating the rate hike was the comple-
tion and placement into commercial operation of the utility's Ottumwa
Generating Station.1 6 The 650 megawatt (MW) coal-fired power plant
pushed the available generating capacity of Iowa-Illinois to a record
high.17 Ottumwa was placed into commercial operation in May 1981;18
its planning and construction had taken more than seven years.19 Iowa-
Illinois' investment in the plant accounted for approximately 125 MW of
excess capacity, the formula for adjusting the return on excess capacity or any statutory or eviden-
tiary issues." Id. at 429-30.
13. This Article focuses on judicial and administrative decisions which have been rendered
since 1983. For a list of prior excess capacity decisions, see Colton, supra note 1, at 1133 nn. 1-2.
14. Several excess capacity rate cases are presently pending: Union Elec. Co., No. 84-0109 (Il.
Commerce Conim'n filed Feb. 15, 1984); Public Serv. Co., No. 37414 (Ind. Pub. Serv. Comm'n filed
May 25, 1984); Union Elec. Co., Nos. ER-84-168 and EO-85-17 (Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n filed Feb.
15, 1984).
15. See Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co. v. Iowa State Commerce Comm'n, 347 N.W.2d 423, 425
(Iowa 1984).
16. Record at 172, Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 616 (Iowa State Com-
merce Comm'n 1982).
17. See Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th at 622.
18. 347 N.W.2d at 428.
19. For a general discussion of power plant construction duration, see C. KOMANOFF, POWER
PLANT COST ESCALATION 227-34 (1981).
[Vol. 20:402
3
Colton: Excess Capacity: A Case Study in Ratemaking Theory and Applicatio
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1984
RA TEMAKING THEORY
new generating capacity."z
In the 1981 rate proceeding, the Iowa State Commerce Commission
was faced with the issue of whether all of the company's investment in
plant was necessary to provide reasonably adequate service.21 Consumer
advocates argued that adequacy of service should be measured by
whether the utility had the ability to produce sufficient electricity at the
time of its peak demand.22 Peak demand is the greatest demand at any
one time over the course of the year.23 For Iowa-Illinois, peak is associ-
ated with the hottest day of the summer.24 The Iowa commission found
that Iowa-Illinois had an annual peak load of 953 MW.25
The Iowa commission further found that Iowa-Illinois could reason-
ably maintain a capacity reserve margin of twenty-five percent over
peak. 6 A reserve margin is needed to provide a cushion to account for
uncertainty in demand forecasting2 7 and to allow for the possibility that
one or more of a utility's power plants might be unable to produce elec-
tricity at the time of the peak.28 According to the commission, only gen-
erating capacity exceeding 125% of a utility's actual annual peak load
was beyond that investment necessary to ensure reliability29 or provide
economic benefits to existing customers.3 ° Using the 125% guide,31 the
commission found that Iowa-Illinois had 199 MW of excess
20. 347 N.W.2d at 428.
21. 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th at 617-23.
22. Direct Testimony of Mr. Richard Cool, Record at 1007-14, Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co.,
46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 616 (Iowa State Commerce Comm'n 1982). This testimony also discussed the
need for a company to maintain adequate reserve margins.
23. EDISON ELECTRIC INsTITUTE, GLOSSARY: ELECTRIC UTILITY RATEMAKING AND LOAD
MANAGEMENT TERMS 25 (1978); see Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 109 Wis.
2d 127, -, 325 N.W. 2d 339, 341 n.6 (1982).
24. W. MARSH, ECONOMICS OF ELECTRIC UTILrY POWER GENERATION 67 (1980).
25. 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th at 622.
26. Id. at 621.
27. W. MARSH, supra note 24, at 90.
28. Madison Gas & Elec, 109 Wis. 2d at -, 325 N.W.2d at 341 n.7. In 1984, the Pennsylvania
Public Utilities Commission found:
An acceptable reserve generating capacity margin for any particular electric utility is de-
pendent upon the generation mix, availability of generating units, peak-load requirements,
the period during which the peaking capacity is required, rates of forced outages, transmis-
sion capabilities, interconnections with other utilities, and transfers of energy during emer-
gency. These are some of the operating factors which must be considered when reaching a
determination concerning an acceptable generating reserve margin.
Pennsylvania Power Co., 60 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 593, 602 (Pa. P.U.C. 1984).
29. 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th at 620.
30. Id. at 621.
31. The 25% reserve margin was to be used only for the purpose of testing the evidence in the
case being decided. Utility companies were not to use that figure as a planning reserve in power
plant certification proceedings. See id.
1985]
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investment.32
In making its excess capacity adjustment, however, the Iowa com-
mission made two specific findings of fact which served as the foundation
for challenges to the rate decision brought by Iowa-Illinois on appeal.
First, the initial decision to build the Ottumwa power plant was pru-
dent. 33  The commission found that the plant was constructed in re-
sponse to concerns about potential electric energy shortages in the
1980's. 34 Even the Iowa Supreme Court noted the concern of the com-
mission and others when the decision to construct Ottumwa was made. 3.
Second, the company argued that each of the Iowa-Illinois power plants
including Ottumwa was individually used and useful.36 Each plant was
operated during the course of the test year 37 and provided some benefit to
company ratepayers. 38 The commission expressly found that the Ot-
tumwa plant was useful because it might operate more efficiently than
the company's other plants.39  Iowa-Illinois later argued to the Iowa
Supreme Court that these two findings of fact-both that the decision to
build Ottumwa was prudent when made and that all company plants
including Ottumwa were individually used and useful-should insulate
the utility from any excess capacity adjustment.4
32. Id. at 622.
33. Id. at 621.
34. Id. In a prior proceeding, one commission member wrote:
I served on this commission in April 1972 when the prospect of severe electric shortages
motivated me and my fellow Commissioners to order the convening of a conference of
Iowa utilities to study how that shortage would be met. The Ottumwa Generating Station
seemed a responsible solution to our concerns about shortages in the supply of electricity.
In a relatively short period of time (10 years), we have witnessed almost a complete
reversal of the problem of electric supplies. We have gone from a situation of near panic
over the possibility of shortages of electricity to a situation where our concern is that of an
excessive supply of power.
Iowa Power & Light Co., Nos. RPU-78-27, RPU-78-30, RPU-80-36, slip op. at 1 (Iowa State Com-
merce Comm'n Feb. 19, 1982) (Moore, Comm'r, dissenting).
35. 347 N.W.2d at 428; accord Minnesota Power & Light Co., No E-015/GR-81-250, slip op.
at 7 (Minn. P.U.C. Apr. 30, 1982).
36. 347 N.W.2d at 429; cf Pennsylvania Power Co., 60 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 593, 600 (Pa.
P.U.C. 1984) (utility argued that each plant was used and useful).
37. Proposed Decision at 5, Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 616 (Iowa
State Commerce Comm'n 1982).
38. See 347 N.W.2d at 428; cf. City of Cleveland v. Public Util. Comm'n, 63 Ohio St. 2d 62,...,
406 N.E.2d 1370, 1374 (1980) (typical start up problems of a nuclear power plant do not preclude a
used and useful finding).
39. 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th at 618-19. Analysts may question, however, whether the commission
applied an appropriate test regarding the burden of proof. The commission found that Ottumwa was
used and useful since the plant may operate more efficiently than other plants. Id. at 618. If the
commission could only find that Ottumwa may operate more efficiently, it could also have found
that Ottumwa may not operate more efficiently. If the commission had adopted the alternate hold-
ing, the burden of proving the plant's usefulness would not necessarily have been met.
40. 347 N.W.2d at 428.
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B. The Commerce Commission Decision
The Iowa State Commerce Commission adopted a cost-sharing ap-
proach to excess capacity in its rate decision regarding Iowa-Illinois Gas
and Electric Company.41 The commission denied a full rate of return on
the surplus investment by apportioning the costs of the excess between
investors and ratepayers. The commission developed a formula for reve-
nue adjustment42 which "had the effect of reducing the return on excess
capacity on a graduated scale." 3 Under the formula, the disallowed re-
turn increased at an accelerating rate as the excess capacity increased.'
The commerce commission engaged in a two-step analysis in mak-
ing its excess capacity adjustment. The first step was to determine
whether and to what extent the utility had an excess. The second step
was to determine how to apportion the costs associated with the excess.45
1. To What Extent Does Excess Exist
In determining to what extent Iowa-Illinois had excess capacity, the
commerce commission considered both the need for plant to ensure relia-
bility as well as the economic justification for generating capacity.46
There was little question as to what capacity was deemed appropriate for
reliability purposes. The Mid-Continent Area Power Pool (MAPP), the
regional reliability council,47 had previously established fifteen percent as
41. 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th at 621-22; cf Washington Water Power Co., 58 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th
126, 131-32 (Idaho P.U.C. 1984) (shareholders should not be absolutely responsible, but ratepayers'
obligations should be reasonable); Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 55 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 185, 199
(Pa. P.U.C. 1983) (balancing the interests of ratepayers and stockholders requires sharing the risks).
42. 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th at 622. The Iowa State Commerce Commission adopted the follow-
ing excess capacity adjustment formula: Return adjustment equals excess capacity divided by total
generating capacity times net investment in total generating capacity times the weighted cost of
common equity times the excess capacity divided by annual peak load. Id.
43. 347 N.W.2d at 428.
44. Id.
45. Proposed Decision at 8, Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 616 (Iowa
State Commerce Comm'n 1982).
46. 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th at 619-20; accord City of Cleveland, 63 Ohio. St. 2d at -, 406
N.E.2d at 1374 (case by case determination of need required); Washington Water Power, 58 Pub.
Util. Rep. 4th at 131 (new plant neither realistically nor economically feasible); Pennsylvania Power,
55 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th at 200 (discussing reliability and economic considerations).
47. The North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) was formed by the electric
utility industry in 1968 to promote the reliability and adequacy of bulk power supply in the
electric utility systems of North America. NERC consists of nine regional reliability coun-
cils and one affiliate encompassing virtually all of the power systems in the United States
and Canada.
NORTH AMERICAN ELECTRIC RELIABILITY COUNCIL, 1984 SUMMER ASSESSMENT OF OVERALL
ADEQUACY OF BULK POWER SUPPLY IN THE ELECTRIC UTILITY SYsTEMs OF NORTH AMERICA at
ii (May 15, 1984).
1985]
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the proper reserve margin for this purpose.48 Nevertheless, the commis-
sion determined that use of the fifteen percent figure alone would not be
sufficient to establish a finding of excess capacity. By contract, MAPP
required all of its member utilities to maintain a minimum reserve level
of fifteen percent.49 To declare all capacity above that figure as excess
would also use the figure as a maximum amount. The commission con-
cluded that setting the minimum and maximum allowable investment at
the same level would require a level of planning precision which no util-
ity manager could reasonably be expected to meet."°
The commerce commission further held that reliability of a utility
system is not the only criterion to use in assessing the desirability of in-
creased reserve margins. Reserve margins maintained for reliability pur-
poses must be economically justified.51 The duty of a public utility is to
maintain adequate service at the lowest cost. 2 The mere act of increasing
reliability does not automatically further that end. Increased reliability is
governed by the law of diminishing returns. The commerce commission
stated: "As generating capacity rises above the 15 percent minimum re-
serve level, the marginal benefits to ratepayers decrease and additional
reserves only add to the cost of the service."15 3 The commission is to
measure the costs and benefits of increasing capacity.5 4 It expressly
noted that "there is a point at which capacity clearly exceeds the require-
ments of the utility's customers. 55
The economics of reserve margins work two ways, however, as in-
creased reserve margins can also be justified solely on nonreliability
grounds. The commerce commission found that the minimum reliability
level and the minimum cost level are not necessarily the same.56 In look-
ing at the economic justification of specific levels of capacity, the com-
48. 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th at 619-20.
49. Id. at 620.
50. Id.
51. Id. Economically justified margins are analyzed in different ways. Some regulators allow
the reserves to be justified by such methods as the replacement of more expensive oil-fired and natu-
ral gas-fired capacity. See, eg., Public Serv. Co., 51 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 6, 12 (Ind. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1983); Iowa-Illinois, 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th at 619. Other regulators hold that the capacity
must only be economically justified over the life of the project. See, e.g., Public Serv. Co., 57 Pub.
Util. Rep. 4th 563, 577-78 (N.H. P.U.C. 1984).
52. 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th at 621; see also Federal Power Comm'n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co.,
315 U.S. 575, 585 (1942) (lowest reasonable rate not confiscatory); Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466,
545 (1898) (rates must be reasonable and just).
53. 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th at 620.
54. See id. at 621.
55. Id. at 620.
56. Id. at 619.
[Vol. 20:402
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mission decided to consider operating costs and benefits also. 5 7 The
Ottumwa plant, for example, was viewed to be used and useful since
"consumers receive some benefit from the addition of [the Ottumwa unit]
with its lower operational cost."58 Moreover, the commission approv-
ingly cited Iowa-Illinois' evidence which indicated that some surpluses
above the minimum reliability standard might be justified "by replace-
ment of oil-fired capacity with nuclear and coal-fired plant." 59
In the Iowa-Illinois administrative decision, the Iowa State Com-
merce Commission ultimately determined that capacity, which was
neither necessary for reliability purposes nor justified on other economic
grounds, was excess. A utility was not entitled to fully recover costs on
such an investment.' Thus the next inquiry was the type of cost-sharing
scheme to be created.
2. To What Extent Do Investors or Ratepayers Pay for the
Excess
The commerce commission decided that Iowa-Illinois ratepayers
should be relieved of the burden of paying the full costs of investment
which are not necessary for the public use.61 It refused, however, to
adopt a number of proposals which would have put the bulk of the finan-
cial burden on investors. The commission rejected the notion that appli-
cation of the used and useful test would require the excess to be excluded
from rate base altogether. The commission said that this test "did not
provide an answer to the question of whether ratepayers should reim-
burse Iowa-Illinois for its admittedly prudent investment in total capac-
ity."62 The commission also rejected the proposal that the company lose
its entire common equity return on the excess, noting that this approach
failed to recognize "the gradations in degree of management error inher-
ent in decisions to increase capacity."63
In discussing gradations in management error, the commerce com-
mission quite clearly tied its excess capacity revenue adjustment to equi-
57. Id. at 619-20; accord City of Cleveland v. Public Util. Comm'n, 63 Ohio St. 2d 62, -, 406
N.E.2d 1370, 1374 (1980); Public Serv. Co., 51 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 6, 12 (Ind. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1983); Pennsylvania Power Co., 60 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 593, 600 (Pa. P.U.C. 1984); Pennsylvania
Power & Light Co., 55 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 185, 198-200 (Pa. P.U.C. 1983).
58. 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th at 619.
59. Id.; accord Public Serv. Co., 51 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 6, 12 (Ind. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1983).
60. Proposed Decision at 8, Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 616 (Iowa
State Commerce Comm'n 1982).
61. 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th at 620.
62. Id. at 619. But see Pennsylvania Power & Light, 55 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th at 201-02.
63. 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th at 621.
1985]
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table factors. One such factor was the utility's culpability in having a
surplus. The commission stated: "[Clompanies which have exceeded an
acceptable reserve margin by only 2 percent should not be so heavily
penalized as companies which have grossly overestimated anticipated de-
mand."" A second equitable factor was the actual financial harm to
ratepayers which accrued from the presence of the excessive investment.
The commission found that "customers of a company which acquires
capacity only slightly in excess of an acceptable reserve are only slightly
more disadvantaged than customers of a company who [sic] comes
within one or two percentage points below the acceptable reserve
margin. 65
The purpose of a cost-sharing formula is to share the risk of capacity
planning. The commerce commission noted that the Iowa-Illinois reve-
nue adjustment was made within a context illustrating this risk." The
case "showed a prudent decision to invest several years ago, the interven-
tion of events not entirely within Iowa-Illinois' power to control, and the
ultimate surplus capacity."'67  The commerce commission expressly
found that ratepayers should share the risks of capacity planning because
the utility investment was undertaken for their benefit.68 In addition, the
fact that the utility's investment decision was based on more than mere
gratuity had to be considered. Iowa-Illinois was "required to furnish rea-
sonably adequate service and facilities,"' 69 and plant investment was "un-
dertaken in response to its statutory obligation to provide adequate
service. ' 70
On the other hand, the commission said that utility "shareholders,
like investors in any other private enterprise, do not make a risk-free
investment." 71 A freely-functioning marketplace would tend to prevent
64. Id. Use of the term penalty is unfortunate and careless. See Colton, supra note 1, at 1150-
51.
65. 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th at 621.
66. Id. There is a theory, however, which suggests that the concentration of analysis on risk is
misplaced. The theory distinguishes risk from uncertainty, and advocates that risk can be minimized
even in an uncertain planning environment. See Sawhill & Silverman, Build Flexibility-Not Power
Plants, PuB. UTIL. FORT., May 26, 1983, at 17; Schwartz & Colton, supra note 8, at 732-35.
67. 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th at 621; accord Public Serv. Co., 51 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th at 12; Penn-
sylvania Power Co., 60 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th at 602.
68. 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th at 621; accord Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 55 Pub. Util. Rep.
4th 185, 199 (Pa. P.U.C. 1983).
69. 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th at 622 (quoting IOWA CODE ANN. § 476.8 (West Supp. 1981-1982)
(amended 1983)).
70. Id.; see also Washington Water Power Co., 58 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 126, 131 (Idaho P.U.C.
1984) (distinction between regulated and unregulated industries).
71. 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th at 618; accord Market Street Ry. v. Railroad Comm'n, 324 U.S. 548,
566-67 (1944); Middle States Util. Co., 36 Pub. Util. Rep. (n.s.) 231, 241 (Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
[Vol. 20:402
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the construction of excessive production facilities even when faced with
the intervention of events not entirely within a company's power to con-
trol. 2 The commission commented on the real world of competitive en-
terprise: "[M]anagement officials must continuously rethink prior
decisions as new events unfold. Those who fail to stay on top of current
events lose out to their competition."7 3 The commission viewed its role
as a marketplace simulator: "Iowa utilities should also maintain surveil-
lance over costs associated with a particular decision, and in the absence
of the kind of incentive provided by a competitor, the responsibility falls
upon us to provide the requisite incentive."7 4 As a result, the commis-
sion concluded that "shareholders must absorb a greater percentage of
the risk as capacity expands further and further beyond a reasonable
level.""5
It was within this context that Iowa-Illinois Gas and Electric Com-
pany advanced its arguments to the Iowa Supreme Court. The first issue
is the application of the used and useful test; the second is the implication
of the finding of prudent management in capacity expansion decision-
making.
III. THE USED AND USEFUL CONCEPT
Application of the traditional used and useful ratemaking test has
relevance to both substantive excess capacity issues as framed in Iowa-
Illinois. Those issues include: (1) whether excess capacity exists in a
utility system; and (2) whether investors or ratepayers should bear the
cost of the surplus. The Iowa Supreme Court addressed each of these
issues. Before looking at the application of the used and useful standard,
however, it is beneficial to first determine the precise meaning of the
phrase.
1940); Montana-Dakota Util. Co., 44 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 249, 255 (N.D. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1981);
Otter Tail Power Co., 44 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 219, 227 (N.D. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1981); Northern
States Power Co., No. F-3382, slip op. at 42 (S.D. P.U.C. Dec. 15, 1981).
72. See 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th at 621.
73. Proposed Decision at 7, Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 616 (Iowa
State Commerce Comm'n 1982).
74. Id. But see supra text accompanying note 70.
75. 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th at 621. The Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission (PPUC)
strongly disagrees with this reasoning and its experience with Philadelphia Electric Company is
instructive. In a 1979 rate case, the PPUC examined the 1977 demand forecasts made by Philadel-
phia Electric Company. It found that the company had substantially overprojected demand even
when projecting only one year in advance. The commission found: "In the past, with customers
paying for company errors in forecasts with resulting excess capacity, there has been no incentive for
company planners to adopt a more responsible and reliable posture in their forecasts of load require-
ments." Philadelphia Elec. Co., 31 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 15, 26 (Pa. P.U.C. 1979).
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A. Defining the Term
Elementary rules of statutory and legal construction indicate that
the term used and useful creates a dipartite ratemaking test. As the
phrase is structured in the conjunctive, it is to be assumed that different
meanings attach to the differing words and that each test must be met
independently.76 To do otherwise would render one of the words mere
surplusage, a result to be neither assumed nor lightly adopted.77 Thus a
utility investment must be both used and useful to be included in a util-
ity's rate base.7
To be used, a particular facility must be operational and actually
providing reliable utility service. The term used was applied in adminis-
trative proceedings involving Council Bluffs Unit 3, a generating plant
owned and operated by Iowa Power and Light Company. 9 Iowa Power
requested a rate increase to recover Council Bluffs Unit 3 costs, which
necessitated substantial inquiry into when the plant had become used. In
its decision, the Iowa State Commerce Commission said: "[U]ntil a new
generating unit has been thoroughly tested under actual operating condi-
tions and has been proven by such testing to meet its design require-
ments, the unit cannot be considered to be used and useful to provide
utility service.",8 0 The power plant was not eligible for inclusion in rate
base if it "did not represent dependable capacity upon which Iowa
Power's customers could rely. . . .,,8 The commission ultimately con-
cluded that, to be placed into rate base, a power plant must operate as
designed and intended at various output levels 2 and be considered a de-
pendable source of power.8 3
The Iowa inquiry closely parallels a line of recent electric cases in
various states in which the precise date on which power plants became
operational was litigated.84 In a 1984 Union Electric Case,8 5 the Mis-
76. "Where two or more requirements are provided in a section and it is the legislative intent
that all of the requirements must be fulfilled in order to comply with the statute, the conjunctive
'and' should be used." IA C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 21.14 (4th ed.
1972).
77. See 2A id. § 47.37 (1982).
78. See infra notes 96-110 and accompanying text.
79. See Iowa Power & Light Co., Nos. RPU-78-27, RPU-78-30, RPU-80-36, slip op. at I (Iowa
State Commerce Comm'n July 31, 1981).
80. Id. at 13.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 12.
83. Id. at 13.
84. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 55 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 537 (Cal. P.U.C. 1983); Commonwealth
Edison Co., No. 80-0546, slip op. at 61-62 (I11. Commerce Comm'n Nov. 9, 1983); Union Elec. Co.,
Nos. ER-84-168, EO-85-17, slip op. at 9-11 (Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Aug. 22, 1984).
[Vol. 20:402
11
Colton: Excess Capacity: A Case Study in Ratemaking Theory and Applicatio
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1984
19851 RA TEMAKING THEORY
souri Public Service Commission sought to establish "in-service criteria"
to be used in determining whether the Callaway Nuclear Plant was fully
operational and used for service.86 The Missouri commission found that
"once [Callaway] is determined to be 'in-service,' it will be eligible for
inclusion in rate base."187  Missouri law expressly "prohibits charges
based on costs associated with property before the property is fully oper-
ational and used for service."88 The Missouri commission then estab-
lished seven criteria to determine when the legal requirement had been
met. 9
The Iowa Supreme Court, while recognizing this distinction in the
construction of the terms used and useful, was not presented with the
need to apply each part of the phrase in Iowa-Illinois. No question ex-
isted in that case as to the application of the term used. All portions of
the generating facility were conceded to be fully operational. Indeed, the
Iowa Supreme Court affirmatively noted that the Ottumwa plant was
completed in May 1981, 90 and was operating at the time of the rate in-
quiry.91 Instead, the Iowa court was faced with the task of reviewing the
commission's application of the second half of the used and useful test.92
85. Union Elec. Co., Nos. ER-84-168, EO-85-17, slip op. at 9-11.
86. Id. at 2.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 11 (citing Mo. REv. STAT. § 393.135 (1978)).
89. The criteria include:
(1). The UE's Startup Testing Program. . . shall be successfully completed. This shall
include a successful uninterrupted run of at least 100 hours during which power is
furnished to the grid at a level between 95 percent and 100 percent.
(2). The Preoperational Test program shall be successfully completed.
(3). The plant and associated transmission facilities have been tested capable of supplying
to the Company's Missouri customers their full share of its rated power and can do
so with the single most critical transmission line out of service.
(4). On the effective date of the Commission's order allowing rate recognition of the Cal-
laway plant, all licenses in jurisdictions other than the Missouri PSC which are
needed to allow the plant to operate continuously at full power shall have been issued
or acceptable commitments obtained.
(5). The plant's operating and NRC compliance history shows evidence of Company
competence.
(6). Exemptions from Criterion 1-5 [sic] may be granted or the determination made that
the plant is 'fully operational' at some power level less than the rated full power
originally proposed for good cause shown.
(7). The plant is supplying electricity to the Company's system with output scheduled by
the system load dispatcher.
Id. at 9-11.
90. Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co. v. Iowa State Commerce Comm'n, 347 N.W.2d 423, 428
(Iowa 1984).
91. This conclusion is implied in the court's notation that the commerce commission found the
plant could operate more efficiently than the company's other generating facilities.
92. The court's inquiry regarding a facility's usefulness discussed whether a particular invest-
ment was necessary for or beneficial to company ratepayers. See infra notes 96-112 and accompany-
ing text.
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This emphasis is indicated in the court's discussion of the commission
finding "that the Ottumwa plant was useful to the ratepayers because it
could operate more efficiently than other Iowa-Illinois generating facili-
ties.""3 The court also said that in excess capacity litigation, it was not
enough to simply look at the usefulness of particular facilities, but rather
at the usefulness of the total facilities.94 Clearly, the Iowa Supreme
Court distinguished between the terms used and useful, a distinction
which is important in an excess capacity evaluation.
The division of the used and useful test is well recognized in excess
capacity litigation.96 The New Hampshire Public Utility Commission
considered whether a transmission line constructed to serve the Seabrook
Nuclear Station should be included in the rate base.97 The commission
noted that the line had been energized in 1983, and that the entire line
was used by Public Service Company of New Hampshire. 9 This opera-
tional aspect of the line, however, was not deemed determinative of the
rate base issue: "The parties do disagree . . . on whether or not the
entire line is useful at this time." 99 The commission found that the line's
function in enhancing reliability, reducing line losses, and enhancing the
ability of the utility to provide wheeling services established the useful-
ness of the entire line."°
Similarly, Washington state utility regulators applied a divided used
and useful test to assess whether new investment was eligible to be in-
cluded in rate base. In Washington Utilities & Transportation Commis-
sion v. Pacific Power & Light Co.," ° the state utility commission
considered whether that company's share of the 700 MW Colstrip 3
power plant should be allowed in the rate base.102 The commission de-
fined the regulatory test: "'Used' is defined as 'employed in accomplish-
ing something'; 'useful' is defined as 'capable of being put to use: having
93. 347 N.W.2d at 428.
94. Id. at 429.
95. The used and useful test can be traced back nearly 100 years to the seminal case of Smyth v.
Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 544 (1898). The Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle in 1938 when it held
that a utility is not entitled to have included in its rate base any property not used and useful to
render utility service. See Denver Union Stockyard Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 470, 475 (1938).
96. The distinction between the two terms is widely recognized, even though the phrase as a
whole is defined differently. See infra notes 101-09 and accompanying text.
97. Public Serv. Co., 57 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 563, 576 (N.H. P.U.C. 1984).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 577.
101. 60 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 188 (Wash. Util. & Transp. Comm'n 1984).
102. Only 10% of Colstrip 3, a plant located in Montana, was owned by Pacific Power and Light
Company. Id. at 190.
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utility: advantageous: producing or having the power to produce good:
serviceable for a beneficial end or object.' ,103 The commission found
that the plant was producing power and that the surplus might end in the
near future."° In applying the used and useful test, the commission
held: "Colstrip 3 is used. It now produces power and has been used to
meet the company's power needs. Colstrip 3 is useful. It provides a
source of reserves and is a relatively low-cost resource."' 1 5 The commis-
sion, however, then disallowed cost recovery for part of the plant in light
of other ratemaking issues which had been litigated.106
Finally, the Indiana Public Service Commission determined that the
used and useful test created a dipartite ratemaking test by which to eval-
uate the rate base eligibility of the Gibson Unit No. 5, a generating sta-
tion which consumer advocates claimed was excess capacity.10 7 The
commission stated: "[The] 'used and useful' standard requires: (1) that
the utility plant be actually devoted to providing utility service and
(2) that the plant utilization be reasonably necessary to the provision of
utility service."108 The Indiana proceeding was similar to those of Iowa,
New Hampshire and Washington in that the plant at issue had been de-
clared commercially operational and was presently devoted to providing
utility service at the time of the rate case. The commission, however,
refused to determine the usefulness of the facility merely by looking at
the plant's availability for beneficial ends; rather, the "dispute arose as to
whether or not petitioner's Gibson Unit No. 5 utilization is reasonably
necessary for the provision of utility service to its ratepayers." 109
It is thus apparent that the division of the used and useful test for
purposes of determining the eligibility of excess capacity for rate base
treatment is neither uncommon nor inappropriate. Indeed, the division
seems to quite closely follow the normal lines of ratemaking inquiry. The
used test is to be applied to the actual facility in order to ascertain
whether the plant is actually operational. The useful test is to be applied
to the capital investment in order to determine whether it is necessary or
103. Id. at 194 (quoting People's Org. for Washington Energy Resources v. Washington Util. &
Transp. Comm'n, 101 Wash. 2d 425, 430, 679 P.2d 922, 925 (1984) (quoting WEBsTER'S THIRD
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2524 (1976))).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. The Washington agency excluded portions of the Colstrip investment from rate base on
other grounds. See id. at 194-95.
107. Public Serv. Co., 51 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 6, 11 (Ind. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1983).
108. Id. at 10 (quoting City of Evansville v. Southern Ind. Gas & Elec. Co., 167 Ind. App. 472,
516, 339 N.E.2d 562, 589 (1975)).
109. Id.
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beneficial. 110
B. Applying the Term
A determination of whether a utility's investment in generating ca-
pacity is useful in practice requires a two-fold inquiry. In Iowa-Illinois,
the Iowa Supreme Court first said that utility capital must be necessary
to the ratepaying public; when a part of the investment turns out to be
unnecessary, the cumulative investment is not useful.111 In evaluating
power plants in particular, this analysis connotes an examination of relia-
bility considerations. Capacity must be sufficient to assure that when
customers demand electricity, the company will have adequate means to
supply it.112 The second inquiry is whether the capital is beneficial.
When a portion of the utility's investment does not benefit ratepayers, the
cumulative investment is not useful. 1 3 For power plants, this analysis
looks to the economic and cost consequences of new plant investment.
At some point, consumers would prefer to face the remote chance of
losing service rather than pay the increased costs of obtaining greater
reliability.'1 14
In Iowa-Illinois, the court applied these tests to determine an appro-
priate rate base for the utility. The court stated: "'Rate base' is the
utility's investment in property, used and useful at the time of inquiry, in
rendering utility service."11 5 Thus, the determinative issue in excess ca-
pacity cases is whether the cumulative investment is used and useful. 16
This approach to analyzing excess capacity is one of the most concep-
tually astute articulations of the issue ever proferred.
The Iowa Supreme Court's excess capacity formulation centers on
the requirement that a utility's cumulative investment be used and useful.
A rate base analysis should not examine all units viewed individually
because that approach "ignores the distinction between the usefulness of
110. As shown by each of the above cases, the proper ratemaking inquiry is into the usefulness of
the incremental capital. The regulator is to inquire whether the most recent investment of capital
was necessary to provide service to ratepayers, or whether it provided some economic benefit to
those ratepayers. The regulator is not to remanage the entire system to determine whether some
capital is unnecessary or nonbeneficial.
111. 347 N.W.2d at 429.
112. Washington Water Power Co., 58 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 126, 131 (Idaho P.U.C. 1984); Public
Serv. Co., 51 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 6, 10 (Ind. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1983); Pennsylvania Power & Light
Co., 55 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 185, 198 (Pa. P.U.C. 1983).
113. 347 N.W.2d at 429.
114. See W. MARSH, supra note 24, at 90-97.
115. 347 N.W.2d at 427.'
116. Id. at 429.
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particular facilities and the usefulness of the total of those facilities." '117
Instead, the determinants of usefulness are to be applied to the entirety of
the investment. The analysis ascertains whether a part of the utility's
investment is unnecessary or whether a portion of the investment does
not benefit ratepayers."' Even though all Iowa-Illinois power plants
may have been used and useful when viewed individually, the cumulative
investment in plant was not.1 19 In such a situation, the allotment of in-
vestment which is unnecessary or nonbeneficial is not useful.
This cumulative investment analysis quite logically flows from the
Iowa court's concentration on an evaluation of investment and not of
plant. The court applies the used and useful test to the investment in
property and not to the property itself. 2 In addition, the court distin-
guishes between looking at individual units and looking at the cumulative
investment.12 The difference is crucial; investment is measured in dol-
lars while plant is measured in megawatts. Although individual power
plants may actually be operating and producing power, the total dollar
investment in generating capacity may still be neither necessary nor ben-
eficial. Since rate base is made up of dollars and not of megawatts,12 2 the
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. The Iowa Supreme Court decision contrasts with the decisions of the Minnesota and Wash-
ington regulatory commissions. The Minnesota commission found:
The Commission is solely concerned here with the question of whether [Minnesota Power
and Light Company] chose to operate [new plants] in any way as part of its system during
the test year. The Commission finds MP&L did so, and finds as a result of their operation
that they were used and useful in providing service as part of that system during the test
year.
Minnesota Power & Light Co., No. F-015/GR-81-250, slip op. at 8 (Minn. P.U.C. Apr. 30, 1982);
accord Pacific Power & Light Co., 60 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 188, 194 (Wash. Util. & Transp. Comm'n
1984) (Colstrip 3 plant was actually used, and therefore, used and useful).
120. The thrust of the Iowa court's analysis applies to a utility's investment. The Iowa-Illinois
court stated that a utility's rate base is its investment in property. 347 N.W.2d at 427. The court
also stated that the determinative issue in excess capacity litigation is whether the cumulative invest-
ment is used and useful. Id. at 429. The court's language becomes confused, however, when the
court states: "In the present case the commission factored the excess capacity return adjustment
over all of Iowa-Illinois' units rather than pick out particular units for exclusion .... " Id. This
confusion, however, comes only in reciting the actions of the commerce commission; it does not
purport to represent the analysis of the court.
121. Id.
122. This analysis of rate base is the same as outlined in the major textbooks regarding utility
rate regulation. For example, Messrs. Howe and Rasmussen state that the original cost standard has
an emphasis on the principal invested in the public utility rather than an emphasis on physical
property. K. HowE & E. RASMUSSEN, PUBLIC UTILITY ECONOMICS & FINANCE 91 (1981).
Messrs. Garfield and Lovejoy state: "[T]he property element in the rate base is the sum of the
amounts actually spent for initial construction, acquisitions, and additions and betterments less de-
preciation." P. GARFIELD & W. LovEjoY, PU3LIC UTILrrY ECONOMICS 60 (1964). Professor Bon-
bright states that the rate base is "the total quantum of invested capital or of property 'values' on
which the company is entitled to a reasonable rate of compensation." J. BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES
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total investment in such an instance would not be considered used and
useful and could not be included in the rate base.1
23
The genesis of this distinction between plant and investment can be
traced to the United States Supreme Court decision in Missouri ex rel.
Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission.'24 The
Court considered methods through which property was to be valued for
purposes of determining rate base; 125 however, the important analysis
was made by Justice Brandeis in a dissenting opinion which discussed the
elements of a utility's rate base.1 26 He noted: "The Constitution does
not guarantee to the utility the opportunity to earn a return on the value
of all items of property used by the utility, or of any of them."' 127 More-
over, Brandeis eschewed the idea of examining "the congeries of old ma-
chinery and equipment, called the plant ... ,128 Instead, he
emphasized the capital that made up the rate base: "The thing devoted
by the investor to the public use is not specific property, tangible and
intangible, but capital embarked in the enterprise."'12
9
Historically, neither utility regulators nor jurists have been careful
about making this important distinction when analyzing excess capacity
issues. This failure is not delineated by who does and who does not make
excess capacity adjustments. For example, the Washington Utilities and
Transportation Commission concluded that Colstrip 3 was useful.'3 0
The New Hampshire Commission, in looking at the Seabrook line, recog-
nized "the usefulness of the entire line." 13' The Indiana Commission
found with regard to Gibson that the plant utilization was reasonably
necessary.132 Pennsylvania courts sought to determine whether "the
OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES 150 (1961). See generally C. PHILLIPS, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULA-
TMON 130 (1969) (discussing property valuation for determining utility's net investment).
123. Montana Power Co., No. 83.9.67, slip op. at 16 (Mont. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Sept. 13, 1984).
124. 262 U.S. 276 (1923).
125. Id. at 285-89.
126. Id. at 289-312; see also J. SUELFLOW, PUBLIC UTrLITY ACCOUNTING: THEORY AND AP-
PLICATION 159-60 (1973) (discussion of accounting for utility property and plant).
127. 262 U.S. at 290.
128. Id. at 301.
129. Id. at 290; see also Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 649
(1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("The amount and quality of service rendered by the usual utility
will, at least roughly, be measured by the amount of capital it puts into the enterprise. But it has no
rational application where there is no such relationship between investment and capacity to serve.").
130. 60 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th at 194.
131. 57 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th at 577. The Seabrook Scobie line is a 345 kilovolt transmission line.
Id. at 567.
132. 51 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th at 10-12. "Gibson" refers to a 625 MW coal-fired unit located in
Gibson County, Indiana. Id. at 10.
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property invested in will be used and useful .. ."' Only the Michigan
Supreme Court has recognized the Brandeis distinction. The Michigan
court speaks of a determination of whether the costs of nuclear construc-
tion should be excluded from rate base, and the utility's attempt to have
the costs included.134 Even the Michigan court is inconsistent, however,
as the court also refers to placing an unnecessary power plant in the rate
base.1
35
This confusion or carelessness in discussing the structure of a util-
ity's rate base is puzzling in light of other commonly litigated ratemaking
issues. Working capital is allowed as a rate base item even though no
physical properties are involved.' 36 Customer-contributed capital, such
as the deferred taxes associated with normalization accounting,137 results
in a rate base reduction even though no change occurs in the physical
plant. 138 The gains on the sale of capital assets are often attributed to
ratepayers on the theory that the investors own only the original capital,
not the plant, and thus cannot benefit from appreciation in property
value. 139
The approach taken by the Iowa Supreme Court reaffirms the
Brandeis distinction: "The thing devoted by the investor to the public
use is not specific property, . . . but capital . . . in the enterprise."'"
Rate base is made up of dollars of investment, not megawatts of plant.
As a result, regulators and courts involved in excess capacity litigation
should seek to ascertain whether the cumulative investment, not an indi-
vidual unit, is useful to ratepayers.1
41
C. Applying the Term: Who Should Bear the Cost?
A determination of whether investors or ratepayers should bear the
cost of excess capacity directly flows from the application of the used and
useful concept. According to the Iowa Supreme Court, "'Rate base' is
the utility's investment in property, used and useful at the time of in-
133. Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 61 Pa. Commw. Ct. 325,
433 A.2d 620, 623 (1981).
134. Kelley v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 412 Mich. 385, 412-13, 316 N.W.2d 187, 198
(1982).
135. Id. at 411, 316 N.W.2d at 197.
136. See K. HowE & E. RASMUSSEN, supra note 122, at 92-93.
137. Id. at 84-86.
138. Id. at 86.
139. See Democratic Cent. Comm. v. Washington Metro. Transit Comm'n, 485 F.2d 786, 792
(D.C. Cir. 1973), cerL denied, 415 U.S. 935 (1974).
140. 262 U.S. at 290 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see supra notes 124-29 and accompanying text.
141. 347 N.W.2d at 429; see supra text accompanying notes 117-18.
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quiry, in rendering utility service." 142 The court also stated that the de-
terminative issue in evaluating excess capacity situations is whether the
cumulative investment is used and useful. 43 The portion of the invest-
ment that is unnecessary or does not benefit ratepayers is not useful. 144
Historically, state utility regulators have been reluctant to engage in
a strict application of the used and useful test to excess electric generat-
ing capacity on the administrative level.145 Recent judicial decisions,
however, have not evidenced that same compulsion to avoid rate base
exclusion for investment that is not used and useful. The Ohio Supreme
Court, for example, considered whether the Davis-Besse plant was excess
capacity. 146 The issue was whether the unit was used and useful; a nega-
tive finding would result in the exclusion of the unit from the utility's
rate base.'47 The Michigan Supreme Court also considered the appropri-
ate treatment for surplus investments.1 48 The court looked at the impli-
cations of the ratemaking treatment both before and after construction.
In evaluating the proposed sale of securities for new construction, the
court noted: "The ratepayers are already paying for the completion of
these plants, by subsidizing the higher capital costs that reflect the capital
markets' estimate of the risk that these plants, if and when completed,
will not be included in rate base."149 In discussing ratemaking after
plant construction has been completed, the court remarked:
Under the present regulatory scheme, the utilities may indeed be bet-
ting the company on the wisdom of their decisions to build nuclear
generating plants costing several billion dollars. If they have made er-
roneous decisions and the cost of the additional generating capacity is
not included, in whole or in part, in the rate base, stockholders or
bondholders or both would lose, but the ratepayers would be largely
142. 347 N.W.2d at 427; see also Denver Union Stock Yard Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 470,
475 (1938) (property not used and useful is to be excluded from rate base when calculating maxi-
mum rates permitted for stock yard services).
143. 347 N.W.2d at 429.
144. Id.
145. See, eg., Iowa Pub. Serv. Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 339, 367 (Iowa State Commerce
Comm'n 1982); Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., No. 6630-ER-14, slip op. at 11-13 (Wis. Pub. Serv.
omm'n Jan. 13, 1982). But see, eg., Quapaw Water Co., 39 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 259, 280 (Ark.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1980); Montana Power Co., No. 83.9.67, slip op. at 16-20 (Mont. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n Sept. 13, 1984) (order on motion for reconsideration); Northern States Power Co., 32 Pub.
Util. Rep. 4th 58, 72 (Minn. P.U.C. 1979); South Carolina Elec. & Gas. Co., 59 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th
244, 258 (S.C. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1984).
146. See City of Cleveland v. Public Util. Comm'n, 63 Ohio St. 2d 62, 406 N.E.2d 1370 (1980).
147. Id. at -, 406 N.E.2d at 1374.
148. See Kelley v. Michigan Pub. Ser. Comm'n, 412 Mich. 385, 316 N.W.2d 187 (1982).
149. Id. at 416 n.57, 316 N.W.2d at 200 n.57 (emphasis in original); cf Washington Water
Power Co., 58 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 126, 131 (Idaho P.U.C. 1984).
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unaffected. 150
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has set forth the proper ratemaking
test as well. 151 In reviewing a state utility commission decision to remove
excess capacity from rate base, the court stated: "The touchstone for de-
termining whether or not a prudently constructed unit should be in-
cluded in a utility's rate base is whether or not, during the test year
involved the unit will be used and useful in rendering service to the
public." '152
No court has permitted investment in excess capacity which is not
used and useful to be included in rate base. The Iowa-Ilinois decision
also follows this approach. Under the reasoning of Iowa-Illinois, the al-
lotment which is not necessary to provide service, or which generates no
benefits to ratepayers, is to be excluded from rate base.
153
IV. THE PRUDENT MANAGEMENT CONCEPT
Application of the traditional prudent management ratemaking the-
ory to an excess capacity analysis is relevant to the second issue in Iowa-
Illinois-whether investors or ratepayers should bear the costs associated
with surplus capacity. The prudent management concept dictates that
investors should bear no part of the cost of excess capacity when the
construction was reasonably undertaken. 5 Iowa-Illinois urged such a
theory in its challenge to the imposition of an excess capacity revenue
adjustment by the Iowa State Commerce Commission. Iowa-Illinois re-
lied upon the commission's finding that the utility's decision to increase
generating capacity was prudent when made. 155 The efficacy of this the-
ory was bolstered because the company had been encouraged during the
previous decade to undertake the very capacity expansion which ulti-
mately led to the finding of surplus.'56 Consideration of this prudent
management defense involves the application of both regulatory and con-
stitutional principles.
150. Kelley, 412 Mich. at 418, 316 N.W.2d at 200.
151. See Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 61 Pa. Commw. Ct. 325,
433 A.2d 620 (1981).
152. Id. at -, 433 A.2d at 623; accord Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 109
Wis. 2d 127, -, 325 N.W.2d 339, 343 (1982).
153. See supra notes 46-60 and accompanying text.
154. See Schwartz & Colton, supra note 8, at 722.
155. 347 N.W.2d at 428-29.
156. Id. at 428. The supreme court noted that the construction of the Ottumwa plant was "in
response to concern by the commission and others about electrical energy shortages in the 1980's."
Id.
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A. Defining the Term
Use of an imprudence analysis to determine whether investment in
capacity should be excluded from rate base has historically involved an
emphasis on whether the affected utility acted in good faith. Imprudence
connotes something more than mere error of judgment; the utility's ac-
tion must be characterized by misfeasance or malfeasance on the part of
the decisionmakers 1 -7 The prudent management theory was first articu-
lated by Justice Brandeis in Missouri ex rel Southwestern Bell Telephone
Co. v. Public Service Commission. "8 In the now famous "Brandeis foot-
note," he stated: "The term prudent investment is not used in a critical
sense. . . . The term is applied for the purpose of excluding what
might be found to be dishonest or obviously wasteful or imprudent ex-
penditures." '59 This approach, that prudence is measured by good faith,
has been used by other courts in the past 16 and continues to be utilized
by public utility commissions today.1 61
B. Applying the Term
The major issue in application of the prudent management concept
is determining when a utility must act with the prescribed duty of
care. 162 Substantial differences exist in the resolution of this query. Jo-
seph Manzi recently set forth one school of thought on how this point in
time should be measured. 163 Noting that various problems with generat-
ing plant construction have led to extreme effects in power plant deferrals
and terminations, as well as cost overruns and rate shock, Manzi ob-
served: "[C]ommissions are now aggressively asking-to what extent
157. See K. HowE & E. RASMUSSEN, supra note 122, at 91.
158. 262 U.S. 276 (1923).
159. Id. at 289 n.l.
160. In a 1930's excess capacity case, the Oregon Supreme Court held: "These facts do not
disclose that [the company's] construction of additional plant was reckless or unwarranted." Pacific
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Wallace, 158 Or. 210, 234, 75 P.2d 942, 952 (1938). In an earlier excess capacity
case, a federal district court sought to determine whether the company's actions could be character-
ized by "rascality." See Capital City Gaslight Co. v. City of Des Moines, 72 F. 829 (S.D. Iowa
1896).
But see St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 11 F. Supp. 322, 328-29 (W.D. Mo. 1935),
afid, 298 U.S. 38 (1936); see also Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co. v. Iowa State Commerce Comm'n,
347 N.W.2d 423, 428-29 (Iowa 1984) (prudence of utility decision not sole factor in evaluating con-
stitutionality of rate adjustment).
161. See, e.g., Washington Water Power Co., 58 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 126, 132-33 (Idaho P.U.C.
1984).
162. The "prudent management" theory has been labeled the common law negligence theory of
ratemaking. Pierce, supra note 2, at 511.
163. Joseph Manzi is a group manager for the Kellogg Corporation, a construction engineering
and management consulting firm involved in the design and construction of power plants.
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have the actions and inactions (or both) of the utility contributed to the
severity of the causes? Stated another way, has the management of the
utility been imprudent in their [sic] decision?" 1  Manzi stated that regu-
lators should assess the prudence of capacity construction "at the time
the decision was made." '165 When attention is so concentrated, regula-
tors can more easily understand the industry investment in surplus gen-
eration. State commissions which have adopted the prudent
management theory of ratemaking first consider the long lead times of
power plant construction166 and the inherent uncertainties in the plant
planning process.1 67 As one commission noted, "It is in the nature of
things that projections of future circumstances are rarely precise." '168
Thus, these commissions hold that if the decision to initiate construction
was prudent when made, no subsequent revenue adjustment should be
imposed. 169
Use of the time at which the decision to build was made as a basis
for reviewing the prudence of power plant construction decisions, how-
ever, is not limited to those regulators who decline to approve an excess
capacity adjustment. 170 The Idaho Public Utilities Commission recently
excluded Washington Water Power Company's entire investment in its
Kettle Falls wood-fired generating plant from the utility's rate base. 171
Based on the information available at the time the decision to construct
was made, the commission determined that a prudent utility planner
would have realized that no plant was necessary.1 72 It further concluded
that the decision to build Kettle Falls was "imprudent and unreasonable
from its inception."' 173 The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court also ap-
proved an excess capacity adjustment using this approach, holding that
investment may be excluded from rate base if the plant "is found to be a
result of managerial imprudence at the time the decision to invest was
164. Manzi, The Debate Over Prudency: The Issue Now and What to Expect in the Future, PuB.
UTIL. FORT., Sept. 15, 1983, at 63, 63.
165. Id. "Of course, the examination of imprudence should not be performed using hindsight
but should address the prudence (or lack of) at the time the decision was made." Id.
166. See, e.g., Southern Cal. Edison Co., 23 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 44, 52 (Fed. Power Comm'n
1977); Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 38 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 494, 508 (Ohio P.U.C. 1980).
167. See, e.g., Public Serv. Co. , 51 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 6, 13 (Ind. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1983).
168. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 23 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 44, 52 (Fed. Power Comm'n 1977).
169. See Colton, supra note 1, at 1141-46.
170. See, e.g., Kansas City Power & Light Co., 38 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 1, 14-15 (Mo. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1980); Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., No. 6630-ER-14, slip op. at 13 (Wis. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n Jan. 13, 1982).
171. Washington Water Power Co., 58 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 126, 134 (Idaho P.U.C. 1984).
172. Id. at 132.
173. Id. at 134.
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made."174
Not all utility analysts believe that a limitation should be placed on
a prudence review. Dr. Peter Fisher, a professor of planning at the Uni-
versity of Iowa, recently testified to the Illinois Commerce Commission
on behalf of the Illinois Governor's Office of Consumer Services. 175
Rather than looking only at the decision to build time as the point at
which to ascertain prudence, Fisher posited that there must instead be an
inquiry into whether ongoing management diligence was present. Profes-
sor Fisher stated: "Reasonable planning is required in every manage-
ment decision, from the first stages of demand forecasting and capacity
planning up through decisions to continue, defer, or cancel further con-
struction at any time up to actual project completion." 176 Under the
Fisher line of reasoning, prudence is not a finding which becomes fixed
upon initiation of plant construction, but is an ongoing duty of care.177
Several state utility commissions have adopted Professor Fisher's
analytical framework. The Missouri Public Service Commission was one
of the first to apply this type of review when it assessed the reasonable-
ness of the actions of Kansas City Power and Light Company regarding
the Iatan power plant. 178 In May 1980, the utility declared the Iatan unit
to be in commercial operation and sought to have the plant included in
rate base.' 79 Even though the utility had been granted a certificate of
convenience and necessity seven years before, 180 the Missouri commis-
sion nevertheless found that the Company's actions regarding Iatan fell
short of rational planning and management prudence."8 In reaching
that conclusion, the commission did not examine the utility's decision to
initiate Iatan's construction. Rather, it was subsequent actions by the
utility management which fell short of the prescribed duty of care. The
commission stated: "[A]t least by early 1976, company management
174. Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 61 Pa. Commw. Ct. 325, -'
433 A.2d 620, 623 (1981).
175. Direct Testimony of Dr. Peter Fisher, Union Elec. Co., No. 84-0109 (Ill. Commerce
Comm'n filed Feb. 15, 1984).
176. Id. at 4.
177. Dr. Fisher also stated: "Reasonable planning in the face of uncertainty requires that plan-
ning flexibility be maintained as much as possible. Large and costly projects should be undertaken in
such a way as to minimize premature commitments and as to maximize the ability of the company to
scale down the project or to defer or cancel the project if conditions change so as to render the
project economically unjustified." Id. Dr. Fisher is a professor in the Graduate Department of
Urban and Regional Planning, University of Iowa, Iowa City.
178. See Kansas City Power, 38 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th at 14.
179. Id. at 8.
180. Id. at 10. The certificate was issued on December 14, 1973.
181. Id. at 14.
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knew there would be excess capacity in 1980, when Iatan Unit No. 1 was
scheduled to be completed."' 82 It then criticized company management
for responding to this information by arranging nonjurisdictional sales at
a loss without regard to the costs that the sales would impose upon its
ratepayers,18 3 and for acting to derate its generating capabilities to create
a reasonable reserve margin." 4 The commission concluded: "[A]lthough
the company ordered studies to assist it in developing a construction pro-
gram which would be beneficial to both the company and its ratepayers,
it then ignored the conclusions of those studies which laid out a variety
of least cost options which did not include the construction schedule pur-
sued." 85 The Missouri Public Service Commission thus sharply di-
verged from those policymakers who urged that prudence should be
determined simply at the time the decision to initiate construction of a
power plant was made. Instead, the agency adopted the ongoing-
management-diligence analysis of Professor Fisher.'
8 6
The Missouri decision is similar to an analysis undertaken by the
Wisconsin Public Service Commission.' 87 The Wisconsin commission
was asked to evaluate the reasonableness of an accelerated construction
program pursued by Wisconsin Electric Company in order to assure a
June 1980, commercial operation date for the Pleasant Prairie power
plant. 88 The commission found that the actions of Wisconsin Electric
constituted imprudent management.'8 9 In its decision, however, the
commission did not question either the decision to initiate capacity ex-
pansion or the decision to initiate the accelerated construction program.
Like Missouri, the Wisconsin commission found the utility had under-
taken the construction program based on needs which were reasonably
forecast in 1976;190 however, it noted that "in December of 1979, appli-
cant had new forecasts available which showed substantial excess capac-
ity for the summer of 1980 . . ."191 The commission observed:
[Wisconsin Electric] then had an opportunity to reevaluate its position
and determine whether greater savings could be achieved by reducing
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. See supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text.
187. See Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., No. 6630-ER-14, slip. op. at 11 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
Jan. 13, 1982).
188. Id.
189. Id. at 13.
190. Id. at 12. The 1976 forecast showed a capacity deficit for the summer of 1980.
191. Id.
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its extraordinary construction expenses by deferring the completion of
Pleasant Prairie Unit 1 .... The applicant did not, at that point,
make such a comparative cost analysis, but decided to continue with
Pleasant Prairie Unit 1 construction on its former accelerated schedule
192
The Wisconsin regulators found that this company action resulted in a
"substantial excess reserve capacity in the summer of 1980."193
The Iowa Supreme Court also appears to have drawn from this ana-
lytical framework in assessing the lawfulness of the excess capacity ad-
justment. Regulatory review did not stop with a finding of initial
prudence, but included an examination of later events. Assuming that
the Iowa-Illinois management decision to invest in its Ottumwa plant
was "a management decision that was prudent when made but which
later events prove to have been mistaken," 194 the court rejected the no-
tion that a prerequisite to a revenue adjustment is a finding of utility
misfeasance or malfeasance. 195 If diseconomies result from mistakes in
investment, utility investors are not insulated from the consequences. 196
The court continued: "Nothing in the constitutional requirement that a
utility receive a fair return on its investment prohibits a lower return
from the ratepaying public upon a part of the investment that turns out
to be unnecessary, even when the utility's decision to make the invest-
ment was prudent." 197 The Iowa Supreme Court has thus adopted the
position that the reasonableness of an initial decision to begin construc-
tion is not determinative of whether or not a subsequent decision to make
an excess capacity adjustment is appropriate.
C. Prior Regulatory Encouragement
Utility claims of prudent management are bolstered when the capac-
ity expansion which results in a surplus is affirmatively encouraged by
the regulatory agency making the excess capacity adjustment. In Iowa-
Illinois, the utility argued that the commerce commission had urged the
construction of additional capacity in the 1970's. The court found that
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co. v. Iowa State Commerce Comm'n, 347 N.W.2d 423, 429
(Iowa 1984).
195. Id. at 428-29. Pierce further argues that in the event a state disallows a rate of return on
canceled plants but allows a return on excess capacity, a perverse economic incentive is established.
A utility is encouraged to complete a plant, known to be unnecessary, in order to obtain all or part of
the return which is granted for excess capacity. Pierce, supra note 2, at 524, 542.
196. 347 N.W.2d at 429.
197. Id.
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the construction of the Ottumwa plant was undertaken "in response to
concern by the commission and others about electrical energy shortages
in the 1980's."'"g Because of this encouragement, Iowa-Illinois asserted
that the commerce commission was constitutionally proscribed from sub-
sequently making a revenue adjustment based upon a finding of excess
capacity.' 99
1. Policy Considerations
Substantial policy disagreement exists among utility regulators re-
garding the proper consideration to be afforded prior regulatory encour-
agement of capacity expansion. The Minnesota Public Utility
Commission refused to adjust for excess electric capacity, reasoning that:
"It would be a harsh regulatory principle to require [Minnesota Power &
Light] to construct generating capacity to meet what was then a clearly
expanding demand for electricity and to later penalize MP&L for doing
what it and the appropriate jurisdictional agencies found to be reasonable
at the time."" Opposite conclusions have been reached by the utility
commissions of Missouri 2 0 1 Iowa,20 2 and North Dakota.20 3 State regula-
tory urging of plant construction may resolve the issue of whether utility
management was prudent from the start. Unlike the finding in Washing-
ton Water Power Co. 204 that the investment was "unreasonable from its
inception, ' 20 a company urged to build capacity should not be adjudged
culpable if the construction was in fact initiated. This analysis, however,
assumes the validity of the Manzi approach to the timing of a prudence
determination. 20 6 The Iowa commission, on the other hand, expressly
rejected that approach:
As has been apparent during the last 10-year period, projections of
growth in demand considered during the certification process may not
be realized due to changing economic conditions, international events
and the appearance of new national and state policy considerations.
Improvements in forecasting may be discovered. We must make sure
198. Id. at 428.
199. Id. at 427.
200. Minnesota Power & Light Co., No. E-015/GR-81-250, slip op. at 7 (Minn. P.U.C. Apr. 30,
1982).
201. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 38 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 1, 13 (Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1980).
202. Iowa Pub. Serv. Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 339, 364 (Iowa State Commerce Comm'n
1982).
203. Otter Tail Power Co., 44 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 219, 227 (N.D. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1981).
204. 58 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 126 (Idaho P.U.C. 1984).
205. Id. at 133.
206. See supra notes 162-69 and accompanying text.
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utility companies respond to such changes, perhaps by modifying their
construction plans.207
A decision to construct a power plant, approved and possibly even en-
couraged by state regulators, indicates little about subsequent changes in
the need for the plant and utility reactions to those changes. States such
as Missouri, North Dakota, and Iowa hold that the actions of a regula-
tory agency in a certification proceeding address only the initial decision
point and not the ongoing prudence of company management.
In any event, constitutional claims based upon the fact that utility
regulators previously encouraged the construction of additional generat-
ing capacity should be clearly distinguished from arguments regarding
ratemaking policy. Despite the regulatory encouragement of new capac-
ity investment, no constitutional infirmities exist with the subsequent im-
position of an excess capacity revenue adjustment.08
2. Constitutional Considerations
The actions of a private utility are not converted into the actions of
the state merely because the aftions have been encouraged by the govern-
ment.20 9 Only when the state has mandated a utility to undertake certain
activities does the company's management lose its control of, and respon-
sibility for, the results.210 The United States Supreme Court first estab-
lished this principle for utilities in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.211
The Court considered a due process challenge to the shutoff of electric
service. The utility customer argued that, while Metropolitan Edison
was indeed a private company, its actions were also the actions of the
state because it was extensively regulated, had a state-protected monop-
oly status, and provided an essential service.212 The Supreme Court re-
jected each of those arguments: "[T]he inquiry must be whether there is
a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action of
the regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated
207. Order Requiring Additional Information, In re Ratemaking Treatment of Excess Capacity,
No. RMU-824, slip op. at 4 (Iowa State Commerce Comm'n Sept. 29, 1982).
208. 347 N.W.2d at 429.
209. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350-51 (1974); see also Blum v. Yaret-
sky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004-05 (1982) (approval of or acquiescence in the initiatives of a private party is
not state action); Daniels v. Twin Oaks Nursing Home, 692 F.2d 1321, 1333 (1 lth Cir. 1983) (action
which is not coerced or significantly encouraged by the state, or is not a power traditionally exclu-
sively reserved to the state, is not state action).
210. See, eg., Iowa Citizen/Labor Energy Coalition v. Iowa State Commerce Comm'n, 335
N.W.2d 178, 182-83 (Iowa 1983).
211. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
212. Id. at 350-54.
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as that of the State itself."' 2 13 The customer in Jackson argued that state
regulatory approval of Metropolitan Edison's disconnections of utility
service provided the nexus.214 The Supreme Court disagreed, holding
that approval of utility shutoff practices "where the commission has not
put its own weight on the side of the proposed practice by ordering it,
does not transmute a practice initiated by the utility and approved by the
commission into 'state action.' "215
The Iowa Supreme Court also considered a constitutional challenge
to utility shutoff practices in Iowa Citizen/Labor Energy Coalition v. Iowa
State Commerce Commission.21 6 In this proceeding, a consumer organi-
zation directly challenged the state utility commission's rules permitting
shutoffs in particular circumstances. The allegation of state action, the
consumers said, was buttressed by the fact that the regulatory commis-
sion encouraged the use of shutoffs as a means of minimizing a utility's
uncollectable accounts.217 The court rejected that reasoning:
Nor does the state's encouragement of collection of delinquent bills
convert the limitations to state action. Disconnections remain merely
a permissive device for utilities to use in attempting to achieve that
objective. Commission policy favoring collection of delinquent ac-
counts has resulted in enlargement of the scope of permission to dis-
continue services, but it has not made disconnection for nonpayment
mandatory.218
That court thus adopted the themes first articulated by the United States
Supreme Court in Jackson. The state government was noted to have en-
couraged the utility action, to have adopted a policy favoring the action,
and to have enlarged the scope of permission for the action.219 Neverthe-
less, the Iowa Supreme Court determined that the action remained solely
that of the utility and could not be attributed to the state.220 The state
utility commission had not made the action mandatory since it had not
213. Id. at 351.
214. Id. at 354-55. Some question exists as to the extent of the commission's "approval." The
United States Supreme Court noted: "The District Court observed that the sole connection of the
Commission with this regulation was Metropolitan's simple notice filing with the Commission and
the lack of any Commission action to prohibit it." Id. at 355.
215. Id. at 357; see also Taylor v. Consolidated Edison Co., 552 F.2d 39, 45-46 (2d Cir.), cerL
denied, 434 U.S. 845 (1977) (decision of a private utility not to grant a predisconnection hearing is
not state action even if made pursuant to state agency regulation); Srack v. Northern Natural Gas
Co., 391 F. Supp. 155, 159 (S.D. Iowa 1975) (decision of a private utility to disconnect service is not
state action even if expressly permitted by state agency regulation).
216. 335 N.W.2d 178 (Iowa 1983).
217. Id. at 182-83.
218. Id. at 183.
219. Id. at 182-83.
220. Id.
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put its own weight on the side of the proposed practice by ordering it.22 1
This resolution of utility ratemaking issues is consistent with judicial
analysis in other regulatory arenas as well. The imposition of financial
consequences for private actions sanctioned or encouraged by the gov-
ernment regarding environmental matters has been approved. The semi-
nal case in this area is Greater Westchester Homeowners Association v.
City of Los Angeles.222  The California Supreme Court considered
whether nuisance damages should be imposed for injuries caused by air-
craft noise emanating from the Los Angeles International Airport.223
The city argued that the construction of the airport was approved, if not
urged by the federal government, and that the award of damages pursu-
ant to state law was thus preempted. The court rejected that notion on
grounds very similar to those articulated in Jackson. The court stated:
City concedes that it, and not the federal government, decided to build
and then to expand the airport in the immediate vicinity of a residen-
tial area. It is undeniable that City chose the particular location and
direction of the airport runways. It approved their usage by jet air-
craft. It entered into service agreements with commercial air carriers
all with full and prior knowledge of the potential noise impact.
Admittedly, some of the foregoing actions by City followed fed-
eral advice, approval, and perhaps even encouragement. Nonetheless,
City chose, and was not forced by anyone, to develop [the airport] in
its particular location.224
Finding that the city voluntarily elected to expand the airport, the court
affirmed a damages award.225
The actions of a public utility in constructing power plants would
appear to fall within this same type of reasoning. The decisions of
whether, when, and what type of plant to build are all decisions of utility
management. Several state legislatures have enacted statutes requiring a
certificate of public convenience and necessity prior to plant construc-
tion226 which generally provide for approval or disapproval of company
construction proposals.227 The statutes are triggered by applications
from the utility. The statutes do not preempt utility management in
221. See 419 U.S. at 357.
222. 26 Cal. 3d 86, 603 P.2d 1329, Cal. Rptr. 733 (1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 820 (1980).
223. Id. at 92, 603 P.2d at 1330, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 734.
224. Id. at 98, 603 P.2d at 1335, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 738 (citations omitted).
225. Id. at 100, 603 P.2d at 1335, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 739. The court said the federal involvement
had not "rendered City powerless to prevent or reduce the damages of which plaintiffs complain."
Id. at 99, 603 P.2d at 1335, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 739.
226. Pierce, supra note 2, at 532-35.
227. Id. at 508-09.
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planning a generating system, nor do they provide for regulators mandat-
ing the construction of particular power plants.
Under the line of reasoning set forth in Jackson..8 and its progeny,
as well as the reasoning of Greater Westchester Homeowners Associa-
tion,2 29 a utility is not constitutionally insulated from excess capacity ad-
justments by prior regulatory review and approval of decisions to
construct additional capacity. The licensing of capacity expansion does
not change a practice initiated by the utility and approved by the com-
mission into the action of the regulatory agency for purposes of constitu-
tional analysis. The fact that the state encouraged the utility action,
adopted a policy favoring the action, or enlarged the scope of permission
for the action has no constitutional significance in an excess capacity
challenge.
V. CONCLUSION
State appellate court decisions are now being rendered in cases
where public utilities challenged administrative decisions to impose elec-
tric rate adjustments due to excess capacity. The recent decision in Iowa-
Illinois is noteworthy for its comprehensive review of issues involved in
excess capacity litigation.
The Iowa Supreme Court stated in Iowa-Illinois that a utility's rate
base is made up of capital used and useful in providing service to custom-
ers, a test which has two distinct elements. To be used, a utility's physi-
cal property must be actually operational and providing services to
customers. In contrast, the term useful is applied to the capital invest-
ment and not to the physical plant. An investment must be necessary or
economically beneficial to ratepayers in order to be useful. According to
the Iowa Supreme Court, the determinative issue in excess capacity liti-
gation is whether the cumulative investment, and not the individual
plant, is used and useful. If some portion of utility investment is not
228. 419 U.S. 345 (1974). Power plant certification statutes serve to limit the right which utili-
ties would otherwise have to build new power plants. Approval of a new plant does not make the
choice to proceed with the plant the decision of the state. "If rule limiations did not exist, state
action plainly would not be present in a utility decision to terminate service for nonpayment. Rules
limiting a right that would otherwise exist do not make exercise of the right state action." Iowa
Citizen/Labor Energy Coalition, 335 N.W.2d at 183.
229. 26 Cal. 3d 86, 603 P.2d 1329, 160 Cal. Rptr. 733. Power plant certification statutes are
enabling in character, not mandatory. State regulatory approval of capacity expansion plans thus
does not render a utility powerless to prevent or reduce excess capacity. It is the utility which chose,
and was not forced by anyone, to develop a particular capacity expansion project.
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necessary or if it provides no benefit to ratepayers, then that allotment is
excess capacity which should be excluded from rate base.
Consideration of the contrasting prudent management theory of ex-
cess capacity ratemaking raises its own issues. A claim of imprudence
connotes more than mere error of judgment; it implies some level of mis-
feasance or malfeasance. Regulatory differences exist over the time at
which the prudence of management is to be determined. Although some
states hold that prudence is to be established at the time when the deci-
sion to initiate capacity expansion is made, the more well-reasoned deci-
sions hold that prudence requires ongoing management diligence. The
placement of the threshold time can well be determinative of whether to
make a rate base adjustment for mismanagement.
The prudence issue finally raises the question of what impact prior
regulatory approval of capacity expansion plans should play in subse-
quent excess capacity litigation. Some public service commissions hold
that prior approval or encouragement of construction should insulate a
company from later revenue adjustments. Other commissions hold that
these approvals address only initial prudence and not the ongoing dili-
gence of management. In contrast, the imposition of an excess capacity
adjustment should not turn on the question of fault; the presence or ab-
sence of prior regulatory approval is not relevant to the excess capacity
debate. The Iowa-Illinois decision provides an excellent analysis of the
ratemaking issues and principles to be considered and applied in the ex-
cess capacity litigation which will face the utility industry and state regu-
lators for years to come.
[Vol. 20:402
31
Colton: Excess Capacity: A Case Study in Ratemaking Theory and Applicatio
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1984
